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BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
Thomas E. Repke"
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews recent developments in the law affecting
Virginia businesses and corporations. Part II discusses several
acts of the 1994 session of the Virginia General Assembly that
amend Virginia's corporate, partnership, and limited liability
company statutes. Part III discusses recent judicial decisions in
Virginia courts that address business and corporate law issues.
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During its 1994 Session, the Virginia General Assembly
passed twelve bills in the corporation, partnership, and limited
liability company area that were signed into law.1
* Associate, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., McLean, Virginia; BA, 1987, The College
of William and Mary; J.D., 1990, University of Virginia.
1. The legislation enacted in the corporate, partnership, and limited liability
company areas not discussed in this article includes: (1) House Bill 280 which per-
mits public service companies to enter into partnerships, joint ventures, or other
associations where the purposes of such relationships are found by the State Corpo-
ration Commission (SCC) to be in the public interest and consistent with the provi-
sions of subsection D of Virginia Code §§ 13.1-620 and 56-265.1 to .9. Act of Apr. 8,
1994, ch. 452, 1994 Va. Acts 635-37 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-627(B) (Cum.
Supp. 1994)); (2) House Bill 326 which authorizes the SCC to designate the entity
with which registration statements for securities filed under Virginia Code § 13.1-509
are to be filed. Act of Mar. 3, 1994, ch. 10, 1994 Va. Acts 15 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-509(C) (Cune. Supp. 1994)); (3) House Bill 1213 which authorizes the SCC
to develop regulations to exempt an offer, but not a sale, of a security from the reg-
istration requirement of the Virginia Blue Sky Laws if such offer is made by or on
behalf of an issuer for the sole purpose of soliciting an indication of interest in re-
ceiving a prospectus (or its equivalent) for the security. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 355,
1994 Va. Acts 500-01 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514 (Cum. Supp. 1994)); and
(4) Senate Bill 75 which authorizes cooperative associations to organize as non-stock
corporations and to organize for purposes of conducting any service business or pro-
viding financing to entities which have been organized pursuant to the laws of any
state. Additionally, the Bill prohibits cooperative associations (except for cooperative
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A. Registered Limited Liability Partnerships
As a further example of Virginia's commitment to remaining
in the forefront of business law issues, Virginia became one of
the first states to enact legislation authorizing partnerships to
register and operate as limited liability partnerships (L.L.P.s).'
A L.L.P. is a general partnership in which the partners are
protected by statute from vicarious liability for the professional
malpractice of other partners and employees. States have en-
acted L.L.P. statutes in response to the changing nature, size
and relationships among partners in general partnerships and
concerns regarding the appropriateness of traditional concepts
of general partner liability, particularly in connection with the
potential liability for the tortious conduct of other partners.3
The Virginia L.L.P. legislation4 amended the Virginia Uni-
form Partnership Act (UPA) to provide that a partner in a
partnership registered as a L.L.P.:
[is not individually liable, directly or indirectly, including
by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise, for
debts, obligations and liabilities chargeable to the partner-
ship, whether sounding in tort, contract or otherwise, aris-
ing from negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or miscon-
duct committed while the partnership is [a L.L.P.] and in
the course of the partnership business by another partner,
employee, agent or representative of the partnership.5
The foregoing limitation of liability does not, however, limit
the liability of a partner in a L.L.P. for the partner's own negli-
gence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct, or for negli-
gence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct of any employ-
associations organized to conduct business as a water or sewer company), from con-
ducting business as a public service company. At of Apr. 4, 1994, ch. 217, 1994 Va.
Acts 312-13 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-301 to -307, -309, -309.1, -311.1 (Cue.
Supp. 1994)).
2. Martin I. Luhawoff, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships--the Next Wave,
8 INSIGHTS 23 (1994).
3. Id.
4. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 350, 1994 Va. Acts 483-88 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-2, -6, -15, -18, -34, -36, -40, -43.1 to -43.10 (Repl. Vol. 1994)).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15(B) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
924 [Vol. 28:923
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ee, agent or representative acting under the partner's direct su-
pervision and control in the specific activity in which the negli-
gence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct occurred.6
In order to become a L.L.P. under the new legislation, a
partnership must file with the Virginia State Corporation Com-
mission (SCC) an application stating:
1. the name of the partnership;
2. the address of its principal office;
3. the post office address of its initial registered office, lhe
name of the city or county in which the office is located, the
name of its initial registered agent at that office, and that the
agent is either (a) an individual who is a resident of Virginia
and is either a partner of the L.L.P., an officer or director of a
corporate general partner of the L.L.P., a general partner of a
partner of the L.L.P., a member or manager of a limited liabili-
ty company (L.L.C.) that is a partner of the L.L.P., or a mem-
ber of the Virginia State Bar, or (b) a professional corporation
or professional L.L.C. registered under Code of Virginia section
54.1-3902;
4. a brief statement of the business in which the partnership
engages; and
5. a statement that the partnership is applying for status as
a registered limited liability partnership.'
The initial application for registration must also include a
certified copy of the partnership's certificate and a statement as
to where and when such certificate was recorded.' A majority
in interest of the partners or one or more authorized partners
must execute the application and submit it with a $100 filing
fee to the SCC.' Registration is effective for one year after the
date the application is filed, unless the application is voluntari-
ly withdrawn by filing a written withdrawal notice with the
SCC. ° The L.L.P. must file a renewal application each year
6. Id. § 50-15(C).
7. Id. § 50-43.1(A).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 50-43.1(B)-(C).
10. Id. § 50-43.1(E). Under § 50-43.6, a L.L.P. may withdraw from Virginia by
filing with the SCC a withdrawal notice executed by a majority in interest of the
1994] 925
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within sixty days prior to the expiration of the initial applica-
tion or any renewal application."
The name of a registered limited liability partnership must
include the words "Registered Limited Liability Partnership" or
the abbreviation "L.L.P." as the last words or letters of its
name.' A L.L.P. is required to carry at least $500,000 of lia-
bility insurance (beyond the amount of any applicable deduct-
ible) designated to cover the kinds of negligence, malpractice,
wrongful acts, and misconduct for which liability is limited
pursuant to Virginia Code section 50-15(B) discussed above, and
which insures the partnership and its partners." Every Virgin-
ia L.L.P. and foreign L.L.P. registered in Virginia must main-
tain the following in Virginia: (1) a registered office that may
be the same as any of its places of business; and (2) a regis-
tered agent who must be either (a) an individual who is a resi-
dent of Virginia and is either a partner of the L.L.P., an officer
or director of a corporate general partner of the L.L.P., a gener-
al partner of a partner of the L.L.P., a member or manager of a
L.L.C. that is a partner of the L.L.P., or a member of the Vir-
ginia State Bar, and whose business office is identical with the
registered office, or (b) a professional corporation or professional
L.L.C. registered under Code of Virginia section 54.1-3902, the
business office of which is identical to the registered office.' 4
partners or by one or more partners authorized to execute a withdrawal notice, which
must set forth: (1) the name of the L.L.P.; (2) the date of filing of the initial applica-
tion for registration; (3) the reason for filing the withdrawal notice; and (4) the effec-
tive date (which must be a date certain) of withdrawal if it is not to be effective on
the filing of the withdrawal notice, provided that any effective date other than the
date of filing of the withdrawal notice must be a date subsequent to the filing, and
(5) any other information the partners determine to include therein. Id. § 50-43.6.
11. Id. § 50-43.1(E). A renewal application must satisfy the same requirements as
an initial application, except that the renewal application need not contain a certified
copy of the partnership's certificate. The filing fee for a renewal application is $50.
Id. § 50-43.1(A) & (C).
12. Id. § 50-43.2.
13. Id. § 50-43.3. A L.L.P is considered to be in compliance with these insurance
requirements if the partnership provides $500,000 of funds specifically designated and
segregated for the satisfaction of judgments against the partnership or its partners
based on the kinds of negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts, and misconduct for
which liability is limited by Virginia Code section 50-15(B). A L.L.P. must accomplish
this by either (1) a deposit in trust or in bank escrow of cash, bank certificates of
deposit, or U.S. Treasury obligations; or (2) a bank letter of credit or insurance com-
pany bond. Id. § 50-43.3(C).
14. Id. § 50-43.3. The sole duty of the registered agent is to forward to the L.L.P.
[Vol. 28:923926
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A foreign L.L.P. must also register with the SCC before
transacting business in Virginia. 5 An applicant for registration
as a foreign L.L.P. must file with the SCC:
1. a certificate of status from the filing office in the jurisdic-
tion in which the foreign L.L.P. is registered;
2. a copy of the partnership certificate, if any, filed in the
jurisdiction where the foreign L.L.P. is registered, duly authen-
ticated by the proper officer of such jurisdiction; and
3. an application executed by a majority in interest of the
partners or by one or more partners authorized to execute an
application or renewal application, setting forth: (a) the name of
the foreign L.L.P. and, if different, the name under which it
proposes to transact business in Virginia, which name must
comply with Virginia Code section 50-43.2 discussed above,
(b) the jurisdiction in which it is registered and the laws of
which govern the agreement pursuant to which it was formed,
(c) the address of its principal office, (d) the address of a regis-
tered office and the name and address of a registered agent for
service of process in Virginia required to be maintained in ac-
cordance with Virginia Code section 50-43.4, (e) a brief state-
ment of the business in which the partnership engages, and
(f) a statement that the partnership is applying for status as a
foreign registered limited liability partnership.16
Registration as a foreign L.L.P. is effective for one year after
the date the application is filed unless voluntarily withdrawn
by filing with the SCC a written notice pursuant to Virginia
Code section 50-43.8."7 The foreign L.L.P. must file a renewal
at its last known address any notice that is served on the registered agent. Id.
15. Id. § 50-43.7(A).
16. Id. § 50-43.7(A), (C). The application must be accompanied by a filing fee of
$100. Id. § 50-43.7(D).
17. Id. § 50-43.7(F). Under § 50-43.8, a foreign L.L.P. authorized to transact busi-
ness in Virginia may withdraw from Virginia by filing with the SCC a withdrawal
notice executed by a majority in interest of the partners or by one or more partners
authorized to execute a withdrawal notice which sets forth: (1) the name of the for-
eign L.L.P., the jurisdiction in which it was registered as a L.L.P. and the laws of
which govern the agreement pursuant to which it was formed; (2) that the foreign
L.L.P. is not transacting business in Virginia and that it surrenders its registration
to transact business in Virginia; (3) that the foreign L.L.P. revokes the authority of
its registered agent in Virginia to accept service of process and appoints the Clerk of
the SCC as its agent for service of process; and (4) a mailing address to which the
1994] 927
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application each year within sixty days prior to the expiration
of the initial application or any renewal application."8
B. Virginia Stock and Nonstock Corporations
1. Required Officers of Corporations
House Bill 176 amends the current corporate law, allowing
Virginia corporations greater flexibility in designating the types
of officers a corporation must have. The Virginia Stock and
Nonstock Corporation Acts previously required a corporation to
have a president and secretary. Under the 1994 amendment, a
Virginia corporation is now required to have only those officers
with the titles and duties as stated in the corporation's bylaws,
or in a resolution of the board of directors that is not inconsis-
tent with the bylaws and as may be necessary to enable the
corporation to comply with the execution requirements for docu-
ments filed with the SCC under Virginia Code sections 13.1-
604(F) and 13.1-804(F).19
In addition, House Bill 176 amends the Virginia Stock and
Nonstock Corporation Acts to provide that, in addition to a
corporation's secretary, any other officer designated in the by-
laws or by resolution of the board of directors may have respon-
sibility for preparing and maintaining custody of minutes of
directors' and shareholders' meetings and for authenticating
corporate records."
Clerk may mail a copy of any process served on him under (3) above. Id. § 50-43.8.
18. Id. § 50-43.7(E)-(F). The filing fee for a renewal application by a foreign
L.L.P. is $50.
19. Act of Apr. 2, 1994, ch. 189, 1994 Va. Acts 281 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-693(A), -872(A) (Cum. Supp. 1994)). Virginia Code sections 13.1-604(F) and
13.1-804(F) require that once a corporation has been formed and the directors select-
ed, any documents filed with the SCC must be executed by the chairman or vice-
chairman of the board of directors, the president, any vice-president, the treasurer,
the secretary, or any assistant secretary. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-604(F), -804(F)
(Cum. Supp. 1994).
20. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-693(C), -872(C) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
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2. Merger of Stock and Nonstock Corporations
The General Assembly further amended the Virginia Stock
and Nonstock Corporation Acts through passage of House Bill
644. The new legislation specifically authorizes the conversion
of a domestic stock corporation to a nonstock corporation and
the conversion of a domestic nonstock corporation to a stock
corporation.2'
Under the requirements of the statute, the board of directors
of each stock corporation and the governing body of each
nonstock corporation must adopt a plan of merger.' The plan
of merger must set forth:
(1) The name of each corporation planning to merge and the
name of the surviving corporation into which each other
corporation plans to merge; (2) The terms and conditions of
the merger and the mode of carrying the same into effect;
and (3) The manner and basis of converting the shares of
each stock corporation and the membership interests of
each nonstock corporation into shares, obligations or other
securities of the surviving stock corporation or membership
interests of the surviving nonstock corporation.
After the plan of merger has been approved by the sharehold-
ers and members, if such approval is required under Virginia
Code sections 13.1-718 or 13.1-896, or after the plan of merger
21. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 646, 1994 Va. Acts 920 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-722.1, -898.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-722.1(B), -898.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
23. Id. §§ 13.1-722.1(C), -898.1(C). "[I]f any shares of any such stock corporation"
or any membership interests of any such nonstock corporation 'are not to be con-
verted solely into shares or other securities of the stock corporation or membership
interests of the nonstock corporation surviving from such merger," the plan of merger
must also set forth:
the cash, other property, rights or securities of any other corporation or
entity which the holders of shares of any such stock corporation or mem-
bership interests of any such nonstock corporation are to receive in ex-
change for, or upon conversion of such shares or membership interests,
which cash, other property, rights or securities of any other corporation
or entity may be in addition to or in lieu of shares of other securities of
any stock corporation or membership interests of any nonstock corpora-
tion surviving from such merger.
Id. § 13.1-722.1(CX3).
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has been adopted by the board of directors if shareholder and/or
member approval is not required, the surviving corporation
must file with the SCC articles of merger setting forth:
1. The plan of merger;
2. If shareholder approval was not required, a statement
to that effect, including the reason approval was not re-
quired;
3. If approval of the shareholders of one or more stock
corporations party to the merger was required, with respect
to each such corporation, either: (a) A statement that the
plan of merger was adopted by the unanimous consent of
the shareholders; or (b) A statement that the plan of merg-
er was submitted to the shareholders by the board of direc-
tors in accordance with this chapter and a statement of:
(1) The designation, number of outstanding shares, and
number of votes entitled to be cast by each voting group
entitled to vote separately on the plan; and (2) Either the
total number of votes cast for and against the plan by each
voting group entitled to vote separately on the plan or a
statement that the total number of undisputed votes cast
for the plan separately by each voting group and a state-
ment that the number cast for the plan by each voting
group was sufficient for approval by that voting group;
4. If the members of any merging nonstock corporation
have voting rights, then as to each such corporation, either:
(a) A statement that the plan of merger was adopted by the
unanimous consent of the members; or (b) A statement that
the plan was submitted to the members by the board of
directors in accordance with the Virginia Nonstock Corpora-
tion Act, and a statement of: (1) The existence of a quorum
of each voting group entitled to vote separately on the plan;
and (2) Either the total number of votes cast for and
against the plan by each voting group entitled to vote sepa-
rately on the plan or the total number of undisputed votes
cast for the plan by each voting group was sufficient for
approval by that voting group;
5. If any merging nonstock corporation has no members
having voting rights, then a statement of that fact, the date
of the meeting of the board of directors at which the plan
was adopted and a statement of the fact that such plan
received the vote of a majority of the directors or officers.'
24. Id. §§ 13.1-722.1(F), -898.1(F).
930
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If the SCC finds that the articles of merger comply with the
requirements of law and that all required fees have been paid,
it will issue a certificate of merger.'
3. Shareholder Approval for the Conversion of a Corporation
into a Holding Company
House Bill 643 effectively allows a corporation with more
than three hundred shareholders to become a holding company
without obtaining shareholder approval.' Virginia Code section
13.1-723(A)(3) enables a corporation with more than three hun-
dred shareholders to transfer any or all of its property to a
corporation, all of the shares of which are owned by the trans-
ferring corporation, unless otherwise required in its articles of
incorporation.'
4. Dual Incorporation
The General Assembly also amended the Virginia Stock Cor-
poration Act to subject certain corporations organized under the
laws of jurisdictions outside of Virginia to regulation as a Vir-
ginia domestic stock corporation.' As amended by House Bill
502, the Virginia Stock Corporation Act defines a "corporation"
or "domestic corporation" as:
[a] corporation authorized by law to issue shares, irrespec-
tive of the nature of the business to be transacted, orga-
nized under [the Stock Corporation Act] or existing pursu-
ant to the laws of [the] Commonwealth on January 1, 1986,
or which, by virtue of articles of incorporation, amendment,
or merger, has become a domestic corporation of this Com-
monwealth, even though also being a corporation organized
under laws other than the laws of this Commonwealth.'
25. Id. §§ 13.1-722.1(G), -898.1(G).
26. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 710, 1994 Va. Acts 1030 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-723 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-723(AX3) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
28. Act of Mar. 28, 1994, ch. 122, 1994 Va. Acts 229 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-603 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
1994] 931
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5. Elimination of Requirement of State Tax Commission
Certification Upon Termination of Corporate Existence
If a Virginia corporation seeks to file with the SCC articles of
termination of corporate existence, or if a foreign corporation
applies for a certificate of withdrawal with-the SCC, as a result
of House Bill 1122, the corporation is no longer required to
obtain a certificate from the State Tax Commission certifying
that the corporation has paid all state taxes as of the date of
such filing.0 In lieu of the Tax Commission certification, the
Bill requires corporations in both instances to certify directly to
the SCC that the appropriate returns have been fied and that
all state taxes then due have been paid."'
6. Limitations on Ownership of Professional Corporations and
Memberships in Professional Limited Liability Companies
In House Bill 997, the General Assembly relaxed the limita-
tions on ownership of professional corporations and member-
ships in professional limited liability companies. 2 Under prior
law, each shareholder of a professional corporation and each
member of a professional limited liability company was required
to be duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized in Virginia
to render the same professional services as the corporation or
the limited liability company. As amended by House Bill 997,
Virginia law now requires that only one of the shareholders of
a professional corporation and one of the members of a profes-
sional limited liability company be duly licensed or otherwise
legally authorized to render the applicable professional services
in Virginia.'
30. Act of Apr. 4, 1994, ch. 291, 1994 Va. Acts 404-05 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-750(B), -767(C) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
31. Id.
32. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 349, 1994 Va. Acts 479-82 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-543, -544, -545.1, -546, -1102, -1103, -1106, -1107 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
33. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-544, -1103 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
932
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C. Limited Liability Companies
In House Bill 995, the Virginia General Assembly adopted
several amendments to Virginia's Limited Liability Company
Act.' Most significantly, the Bill eliminated the unanimous
consent requirements previously imposed for (1) transfers of
member interests, and (2) elections to continue the business of
the company upon an event of termination.'
Under prior law, an assignee of an interest in a limited lia-
bility company could become a member of the company only
with the unanimous consent of the other members. As amended
by House Bill 995, an assignee may become a member with the
consent of all members, or by a lesser percentage or number
(but not less than a majority in interest) of the remaining
members as may be provided in writing in the articles of orga-
nization or the operating agreement of the limited liability
company.3
6
The Bill also amended Virginia Code section 13.1-1046 to
provide that upon the death, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy,
or dissolution of a member or occurrence of any other event
that terminates his membership in a limited liability company,
the company must dissolve and its affairs wound up, unless the
company's business is continued by all or such lesser percent-
age or number (but not less than a majority in interests) of the
remaining members as provided in the written articles of orga-
nization or operating agreement of the limited liability compa-
ny."' Under prior law, the remaining members were required
34. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 348, 1994 Va. Acts 477-79 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-759, -763, -921, -925, -1015, -1040, -1106, -1107 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
35. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1040, -1046 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
36. Id. § 13.1-1040(A).
37. Id. § 13.1-1046(A). House Bill 995 also (1) authorizes professional limited lia-
bility companies to serve as registered agents of foreign stock and nonstock corpora-
tions qualified to do business in Virginia and (2) includes as persons authorized to
serve as registered agents of a limited liability company, an officer or director of a
corporation that is a member or manager of such limited liability company, and a
general partner of a general or limited partnership that is a member or manager of
such limited liability company. Id. §§ 13.1-759, -763, -921, -925, -1015.
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:923
to consent unanimously to continue the business of the compa-
ny upon the occurrence of such an event.'
III. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil and Personal Liability for the
Obligations of a Corporation
In O'Hazza v. Executive Credit Corp.,9 the Supreme Court
of Virginia reaffirmed the general rule that Virginia courts will
ignore the separate existence of a corporation and impose per-
sonal liability on shareholders for a corporation's debts only in
extraordinary situations and when necessary to promote the in-
terests of justice."
Francis E. and Susie W. O'Hazza (the O'Hazzas) formed
Sounds You See, Inc., a Virginia subchapter S corporation (the
corporation), for purposes of engaging in the business of install-
ing sound equipment in commercial establishments. The
O'Hazzas contributed $10,000 of initial capital and were the
sole shareholders of the corporation. Guy R. O'Hazza (Guy), a
son of the O'Hazzas and the appointed president, was responsi-
ble for the day-to-day management of the business. Guy re-
ceived $4,500 a month from the corporation in the form of a
loan in lieu of salary. During the initial two years of operation,
the O'Hazzas loaned the corporation approximately $140,000 to
cover operating expenses incurred by the corporation. There
were no corporate documents that authorized or evidenced these
loans. The O'Hazzas testified that they had no expectation of
repayment by the corporation.4'
The corporation entered into a transaction with Executive
Credit Corporation (ECC), an equipment leasing broker, pursu-
ant to which ECC advanced funds to the corporation to pur-
chase sound system equipment for installation by the corpo-
ration at a hotel. In return, Guy executed a promissory note
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
39. 246 Va. 111, 431 S.E.2d 318 (1993).
40. Id. at 115, 431 S.E.2d at 320 (citing Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply
Co., 234 Va. 207, 360 S.E.2d 828 (1987)).
41. Id. at 113, 431 S.E.2d at 319.
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payable on demand by ECC. Under the terms of the arrange-
ment, ownership of the equipment was to transfer to ECC upon
installation, and ECC would lease the equipment to the hotel
for a profit. Subsequent to the purchase of the equipment, the
management of the hotel disapproved the installation and lease
of the equipment, and thus the hotel never consummated the
transactions with the corporation and ECC. As a result, the
corporation defaulted on its obligations under the ECC promis-
sory note. ECC filed suit to recover the unpaid balance of the
note, naming the corporation and the O'Hazzas as defen-
dants.42
Disregarding the corporate entity, the trial court entered
judgment against the O'Hazzas for the unpaid balance of the
note. The court held that the corporation was an instrumental-
ity and alter ego of its shareholders, the O'Hazzas, and was
created for the sole purpose of transferring funds to their
son.' The trial court based its ruling on findings that: (1) the
corporation was undercapitalized and would have failed immedi-
ately without the loans from the O'Hazzas; (2) the primary pur-
pose of the corporation was to allow the O'Hazzas to provide a
constant source of income to Guy through a monthly loan from
the corporation; and (3) the subchapter S election by the corpo-
ration allowed the O'Hazzas to derive a tax benefit from the
operating losses of the corporation, while at the same time
avoiding any gift tax associated with the transfer of funds to
their son.'
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion, holding that the factors relied upon by the lower court to
pierce the corporate veil were insufficient to support the court's
conclusions." Under Virginia law, a party seeking to disregard
the corporate entity must show that the shareholder the party
wishes to hold personally liable controlled or used the corpora-
tion to evade a personal obligation, to perpetrate fraud or a
crime, to commit an injustice, or to gain an unfair advan-
42. It is unclear from the opinion why Guy was not named as a defendant. The
corporation's existence was automatically terminated for failure to pay the annual
license fee, and a default judgment was entered against the defunct corporation. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 116, 431 S.E.2d at 321.
45. Id.
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tage.' A court may justifiably pierce the corporate veil when
the unity of interest and ownership is such that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer
exist and adhering to that "separateness" would be unjust.'
With respect to the trial court's finding that the corporation
was undercapitalized, the court stated that if a corporation
from its inception is unable to pay its costs of doing business
because of "grossly inadequate capitalization," the legitimacy of
the separate identity of the corporation is suspect.' The bur-
den, however, is on the party seeking to pierce the corporate
veil to establish the appropriate level of capitalization for the
particular corporation. The court found that ECC failed to es-
tablish the appropriate level of capitalization for a business
that installed sound equipment.49
The court also disagreed with the trial court's findings that
the primary purposes of the corporation were to allow the
O'Hazzas to provide a source of income to their son and to
provide tax benefits to the O'Hazzas.0 Even if the O'Hazzas
established and funded the corporation to provide a personal
benefit to their son, the court found that the corporation did
not operate solely as a paper entity tor pass money from parents
to child.51 Furthermore, the court provided that neither the
actual nor the potential tax consequences to the O'Hazzas from
the subchapter S election suggested any impropriety which
46. Id. at 115, 431 S.E.2d at 320 (citing Lewis Trucking Corp. v. Commonwealth,
207 Va. 23, 31, 147 S.E.2d 747, 753 (1966); F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMP-
SON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.10 (3d ed. 1971 and Supp. 1992)).
47. 246 Va. at 115, 431 S.E.2d at 321 (citing Lewis Trucking, 207 Va. at 32, 147
S.E.2d at 753-54; 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.30 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990)).
48. 246 Va. at 116, 431 S.E.2d at 321.
49. Id. The court noted that for legitimate tax reasons, small corporations in-
creasingly choose to capitalize the entity initially with a small portion of the invest-
ment represented by stock and with the larger portion of capital set up as loans to
the corporation. Furthermore, the court indicated that the loans made by the
O'Hazzas could have been characterized as equity rather than debt: "[a] loan made to
a corporation by stockholders without expectation of repayment is an indication that
the transaction involved venture capital, not a true loan." Id. at 117, 431 S.E.2d at
321. The court stated that it had never recognized loaning money to a business that
is sustaining losses as a ground for piercing the corporate veil. Id.
50. Id. at 118, 431 S.E.2d at 322.
51. Id.
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would justify piercing the corporate veil.52 Election of subchap-
ter S status for federal tax purposes is a common and legiti-
mate business decision.'
B. Existence of a Joint Venture
In Shintom America, Inc. v. Cellular Information Network,
Inc.," the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia declined to find that a joint venture existed between
a grocery chain and cellular telephone company engaged in a
business transaction to promote the sale of cellular car tele-
phones.'
Cellular Information Network, Inc., a Virginia corporation
(Cellular) entered into a transaction with Farm Fresh, Inc.
(Farm Fresh), a grocery store with locations throughout Virgin-
ia, pursuant to which Farm Fresh bought cellular car tele-
phones- from Cellular for resale in its grocery stores.' Cellular
originally purchased the telephones from Shintom America, Inc.,
a California corporation (Shintom)." Farm Fresh advertised in
newspapers and on radio stations that the telephones could be
purchased at their stores.' The advertisements indicated that
a credit check and a service contract with Contel, Inc. a Virgin-
ia corporation, (Contel) were required of purchasers to ensure
that the purchaser could pay his or her cellular telephone
bills.59
Farm Fresh initiated the credit checks and supplied its cus-
tomers with Contel's service contract. Once Contel approved the
customer's credit, the customer paid Farm Fresh for the tele-
phone. The customer then received a certificate to take to a
designated location where the customer received the telephone
from Cellular. Cellular subsequently billed Farm Fresh for the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 825 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Va. 1993).
55. Id. at 112.
56. Id. at 110.
57. Id. at 109.
58. Id. at 110.
59. Id.
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number of telephones sold.' A wholly-owned subsidiary of Cel-
lular performed the installation, service activation, and tele-
phone programming pursuant to the service contract between
the customer and Contel. In return for such services, Contel
paid the subsidiary $350 per telephone installation.61
Farm Fresh never held the telephones in its inventory. More-
over, there was no evidence that Farm Fresh required Cellular
to maintain a minimum inventory to satisfy the Farm Fresh
promotion requirements. Farm Fresh, in its sole discretion, set
the prices for the telephones sold at its stores. Farm Fresh was
not involved in the ordering and purchasing of the telephones
by Cellular from Shintom. Although it was aware of the promo-
tion between Cellular and Farm Fresh, Shintom never required
Farm Fresh to provide any information, credit application, guar-
anty, pledge or other legal obligation to pay for the cellular
telephones ordered by Cellular for the Farm Fresh promo-
tion.62
Cellular subsequently defaulted on its obligations to pay
Shintom for the purchase of certain telephones.' In an at-
tempt to make Farm Fresh liable for the debts of Cellular,'
Shintom alleged that a joint venture had been created between
Farm Fresh and Cellular.' The district court found that no
joint venture existed between Farm Fresh and Cellular because
they did not share in the profits or losses of the promotions,
nor did they control or manage them."
In making its decision, the district court identified the ele-
ments of a joint venture in Virginia: "an agreement, express or
implied to (1) jointly share in the profits and losses of an un-
dertaking in which the parties have a community of interest in
the object and purpose and (2) have joint and mutual control
and management by each party over the other in respects
60. Id. at 110-11.
61. Id. at 110.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 109.
64. Prior to trial, Shintom and Cellular settled. Farm Fresh acknowledged the
settlement but noted that it did not agree to the amount settled upon and reserved
the right to contest any award Shintom claimed due from Farm Fresh. Id. at 111.
65. Id. at 109.
66. Id. at 111.
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thereto." 7  The court relied on Flip Mortgage Corp. v.
McElhone' and Wells v. Whitaker69 to support its decision
that the elements of a joint venture were not present in
ShintoM.70
In Flip Mortgage, the Fourth Circuit declined to find that a
joint venture existed between a mortgage company and a com-
puter company that had contracted to develop and market a
family of computerized mortgage-related services."' The com-
puter company managed and operated the business and paid
the mortgage company an agreed upon percentage of revenues
from operations. '2 Although the mortgage company controlled
certain business decisions under the arrangement, the majority
of the decisions were made by the computer company."3 Stress-
ing the lack of both mutual control and sharing of profits and
losses, the Fourth Circuit determined that the companies "were
engaged in a relatively straightforward contractual relation-
ship,"74 and thus the evidence did not warrant a finding of a
joint venture. 5
In Wells, an explosives mixing plant operator and an explo-
sives supplier entered into an arrangement pursuant to which
the operator mixed, sold, and delivered to mining operations
certain explosives received from the supplier on consignment.76
The supplier regularly inventoried the consigned goods at the
mixing plant and reviewed plant procedures to advise the oper-
ator and its employees how to more effectively operate the
plant and maintain its equipment.7 In declining to find a joint
venture between the parties, the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the advice and assistance provided by the supplier was
akin to providing assistance to a prospective purchaser, and
thus was insufficient evidence of any joint control or manage-
67. Id.
68. 841 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1988).
69. 207 Va. 616, 151 S.E.2d 422 (1966).
70. 825 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. Va. 1993).
71. 841 F.2d at 539-40.
72. Id. at 533.
73. Id. at 539.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 53940.
76. 207 Va. 616, 619-20, 151 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1966).
77. Id. at 620, 151 S.E.2d at 427.
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ment between the parties.78 In addition, the court found there
was insufficient evidence to show the parties shared any profits
or losses:
Profits accruing from the movement of [goods] from the
manufacturer... to the processor... and then to the
ultimate consumer cannot be said to be a sharing of the
profits of the processor. The profit accruing must be joint
and several. Otherwise every person, firm or corporation
who furnishes material or supplies in connection with an
enterprise might be termed joint ventures, whether or not
they had any such intention."
Relying on the holdings of Flip Mortgage and Wells, the dis-
trict court in Shintom held that there was no evidence of any
agreement between Cellular and Farm Fresh to share in the
profits and losses of any undertaking. Also, there was no evi-
dence that either Cellular or Farm Fresh had any control over
one another in the sale and installation of the cellular tele-
phones. Farm Fresh and Cellular derived their profits from
different sources, none of which were shared with the other
party. Farm Fresh incurred the majority of the costs of the ad-
vertisements and never attempted to recoup such costs from
Cellular.'
Additionally, as in Flip Mortgage, the parties in Shintom did
not share in the control or management of the sale, installation
and servicing of the cellular telephones. Farm Fresh set what-
ever price it wished for sale to its customers, without regard to
Cellular. Any advice Cellular gave to Farm Fresh regarding the
advertising was, as in Wells, merely technical due to the nature
and complexity of cellular service and was rendered so as to not
mislead Farm Fresh's customers. Farm Fresh, independently
and without control or management by Cellular, determined
which of its stores would run the promotions and which part of
the store would hold the promotions. Cellular, independently
and without control or management by Farm Fresh, acquired
the telephones for sale in promotions and installed and serviced
the phones after their sale by Farm Fresh. The Court concluded
78. Id. at 626, 151 S.E.2d at 430-31.
79. Id. at 626-27, 151 S.E.2d at 431 (emphasis added).
80. 825 F. Supp. 108, 112 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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that this "relatively straightforward contractual relationship"
between Farm Fresh and Cellular did not amount to a joint
venture."'
C. Class Certification Under Federal Securities Law
In Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 2 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the "fraud
on the market" theory in a federal securities fraud case permits
class certification despite individual issues of reliance upon
alleged misrepresentations.'
Microdyne Corporation, a Maryland corporation with offices
in Virginia (Microdyne), was engaged in the business of design-
ing, manufacturing, and marketing computer and communica-
tions network products and software. Microdyne's common stock
is publicly held and traded on NASDAQ. On February 11, 1992,
on the basis of information provided by Microdyne's President
and Chief Executive Officer, a published securities analyst's
report estimated that Microdyne would earn $0.25 per share for
its third fiscal quarter ending June 30, 1992. The President
told the Dow Jones Newservice that he was "comfortable" with
the earnings estimates. On February 12, 1992, the Dow Jones
Newswire reported the President's comfort with the published
earnings estimates. The price of Microdyne stock increased from
$12-114 per share on the day of the analyst's report to $13-5/8
per share on the day the Newswire published the President's
"comfort" statement."
From February to June, Microdyne publicly promoted its
prospects for growth. Primarily, these statements were based on
projections of sales of two new products Microdyne introduced
in April 1992. In mid-June 1992, Microdyne stated that instead
of the $0.25 projected in February, its third quarter earning
would be $0.08 to $0.12 per share. Microdyne announced that
sales for the two new products would be substantially less than
initially projected for the third quarter because of a longer than
81. Id.
82. 148 F.R.D. 153 (E.D. Va. 1993).
83. Id. at 158.
84. Id. at 154-55.
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expected product selling cycle, causing profits to be realized
later than previously anticipated. After this statement,
Microdyne stock fell to $7-1/4 per share."
The June 15 announcement was followed by assurances to
the public by Microdyne that the market's response to its two
new products was favorable. Microdyne also stated that ana-
lysts still projected fourth quarter earnings of $0.14 to $0.21
per share. On October 8, 1992, however, Microdyne stock fell to
$3-3/4 per share after Microdyne revealed that projected sales
were not realized and that it was going to sustain a fourth
quarter loss of $0.17 per share."
Plaintiffs, two investors who purchased Microdyne stock fol-
lowing the President's "comfort" statement in February 1992,
brought an action on behalf of themselves and sought to certify
a class consisting of all persons who purchased shares of
Microdyne common stock between February 12 and October 8,
1992.87 The defendants argued that class certification was not
appropriate because individual issues of reliance would predom-
inate, making a class action inappropriate.' The court noted
that the plaintiffs' argument involved the causation element of
plaintiffs' section 10(b)(5) fraud claim. 9
To recover under section 10(b)(5) of the Securities and Ex-
85. Id. at 155.
86. Id.
87. Class certification is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rule 23(a) provides that a class action may be maintained only if (i) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (ii) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (iii) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (iv) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Furthermore, a
potential class action must be shown to qualify under at least one subsection of Rule
23(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(bX3). Plaintiffs in Microdyne relied on Rule 23(bX3) which
states that a class action may be maintained if "the court finds that questions of law
or fact predominate . . . over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy." 148 F.R.D. at 156 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(bX3)).
88. Defendants also argued that class certification was inappropriate because two
of the plaintiffs faced the prospect of successful defenses to their claims which would
be unavailable against other class members, thereby precluding a class action under
the "typicality" requirement of Rule 23(a). The court disagreed, finding that the defen-
dants would not have unique defenses against particular plaintiffs. 148 F.R.D. at 159.
89. Id. at 156.
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change Act of 1934,' a plaintiff must establish that the al-
leged misrepresentation caused the injury suffered by plain-
tiff." Courts have held that proof of causation in this context
requires two discrete showings. First, a plaintiff must prove
that he or she engaged in the transaction in question in reli-
ance on the defendant's alleged misrepresentation or omission
(so-called "transaction causation").' Second, a plaintiff must
prove that the misrepresentation or omission caused plaintiff's
economic harm (so-called "loss causation"). 3 The defendants
did not dispute that proof of loss causation could be addressed
effectively on a class-wide basis.' Rather, they argued that
transaction causation is not amenable to resolution on a class-
wide basis because plaintiffs must meet this requirement by
showing that the alleged misrepresentations or omissions
caused the plaintiffs to engage in the subject transaction. Such
a showing, the defendants argued, depends on a separate inqui-
ry into the investment motivation of each class member to
determine whether each individual's decision to purchase
Microdyne stock was influenced by the defendants' alleged mis-
representations. 5
Because the plaintiffs based their claims on the "fraud-on-
the-market" theory sanctioned by the United States Supreme
Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,' the court disagreed with the
defendants' argument. In a "fraud-on-the-market" case, the
transaction causation element does not require a showing that
a defendant's misrepresentations induced every plaintiff to enter
into a transaction in the affected security. On the contrary, the
transaction causation element is satisfied by a showing that a
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1975).
91. 148 F.R.D. at 156 (citing Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc.,
967 F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1992)).
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 313 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986)).
94. Id. at 157. To show loss causation, the court stated that the plaintiffs need
only prove that misrepresentations by the defendants inflated the price of Microdyne
stock above where the price would have been in the absence of those misrepresenta-
tions. If this is shown, the plaintiffs, by purchasing the stock, will have suffered
economic loss caused by the defendants' actions. Such proof, the court stated, would
not involve facts specific to individual plaintiffs. Id.
95. Id.
96. 485 U.S. 224, 226-28 (1988).
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defendant's act affected the terms (i.e., price) of the transac-
tion.97 "[T]ransaction causation, in this sense, is precisely the
same thing as 'reliance,' as used in the Basic opinion and,
therefore, if the 'fraud on the market' theory is found to be
applicable, transaction causation must be presumed.""8
According to the court, the "fraud-on-the-market" theory was
crafted for the very purpose of avoiding the individualized cau-
sation inquiries proposed by the defendants to bar certification
of this class." Because the preconditions for application of the
"fraud-on-the-market" theory are all questions that can be de-
termined on a class-wide basis (i.e., whether Microdyne stock
traded on an efficient market, whether the defendants' misrep-
resentations were material, etc.) and causation will be pre-
sumed if the theory is found to apply, the court concluded that
the action was properly pursued as a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)."°
D. Enforceability of Employer Noncompetition Agreements
Several decisions during the 1993-94 year addressed the issue
of enforceability of employer noncompetition agreements, includ-
ing one by the Virginia Supreme Court and one by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
In New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton,' the Virginia
Supreme Court overturned a trial court's decision and upheld
97. 148 F.R.D. at 157 (citing THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 467 (1985)).
98. Id. at 158 (citing Litton Industry, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967
F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff may "establish transaction cau-
sation by means of the fraud-on-the-market theory, which permits a plaintiff to rely
on the integrity of open, well-developed markets rather than requiring proof of direct
reliance on defendant's conduct")); In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616,
619 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 438 (1991), ("to the extent that
defendant's misrepresentation artificially altered the price of the stock and defrauded
the market, causation is presumed").
99. 148 F.R.D. at 158.
100. Id. Following the completion of the plaintiffs' evidence at trial, the case was
dismissed by the trial court upon the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of
law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court
found that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the alleged statements by
Microdyne and its officers were misleading. 824 F. Supp. 65, 66 (E.D. Va. 1993).
101. 245 Va. 367, 429 S.E.2d 25 (1993).
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the enforceability of a noncompetition agreement."° The plain-
tiff, New River Media Group, Inc. (New River), employed the
defendant, David Collins Knighton (Knighton), as a radio disc
jockey and operations manager of a radio station in Pulaski,
Virginia. When New River terminated Knighton, the parties
entered into a written noncompetition agreement. The agree-
ment provided, inter alia, that in consideration of $2,000 paid
to Knighton by New River, Knighton promised that he would
not engage for twelve months in a business that competed with
New River within sixty air miles of New River's broadcast sta-
tion. Two weeks after being terminated by New River, Knighton
obtained employment at a radio station located within the six-
ty-mile radius of New River's station and returned the $2,000
check to New River. Both stations play country music and at-
tract the same advertisers.1'3
New River filed a suit in chancery seeking to enjoin Knighton
from working at the competing radio station. Knighton filed a
cross-bill, .alleging that the agreement was unreasonable and
oppressive and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The trial
court agreed, finding the agreement to be unenforceable. On
appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling that the agreement was void and remanded the case to
the trial court for entry of a decree enjoining Knighton from
violating the noncompetition agreement."°
In determining whether a noncompetition agreement is valid
and enforceable under Virginia law, the criteria are the follow-
ing: (a) whether the restraint is reasonable in that it is no
greater than necessary to protect the employer in some legiti-
mate business interest; (b) whether the restraint is reasonable
in that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the
legitimate efforts of the employee to earn a livelihood; and
(c) whether the restraint is reasonable from the standpoint of a
sound public policy."5 After consideration of the facts of each
102. Id. at 370, 429 S.E.2d at 27.
103. Id. at 368, 429 S.E.2d at 25-26.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 369, 429 S.E.2d at 26 (citing Roanoke Eng'g Sales v. Rosenbaum, 223
Va. 548, 552, 290 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1982). Accord Blue Ridge Anesthesia v. Gidick,
239 Va. 369, 371-72, 389 S.E.2d 467, 468-69 (1990); Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203
Va. 790, 794, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962)).
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case, a court of equity will enforce a noncompetition agreement
that passes this three-part test."°
The New River court found that the agreement at issue satis-
fied each of the three criteria. The agreement was reasonable
because New River had invested substantial time and money in
promoting Knighton as an air personality, and the restraint
was no greater than necessary to protect New River's legitimate
business interests. The restraint was also reasonable as to
Knighton because the sixty-mile, twelve-month limit was not
unduly harsh and oppressive in diminishing Knightoen's legiti-
mate efforts to earn a living. Finally, the court found nothing
in the record to suggest that enforcement of the agreement
would be unreasonable from a public policy standpoint. 7
In Comprehensive Technologies International, Inc. v. Software
Artisans, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit upheld the enforceability
of a noncompetition provision in an employment agreement,
even though the geographic scope included the entire United
States and prohibited the employee from working for a competi-
tor in any capacity."°
Comprehensive Technologies International, Inc., a California
corporation with its principal place of business in Chantilly,
Virginia (CTI), entered into a termination agreement with one
of its employees (Employee) when Employee resigned from CTI.
The agreement provided, inter alia, that for a period of twelve
months following his departure from CTI, Employee would not:
[e]ngage directly or indirectly in any business within the
United States (financially as an investor or lender or as an
employee, director, officer, partner, independent contractor,
consultant or owner or in any other capacity calling for the
rendition of personal services or acts of management, opera-
tion or control) which is in competition with the business of
CTI. For purposes of this Agreement, the "business of CTI"
shall be defined as the design, development, marketing, and
106. Id. (citing Blue Ridge Anesthesia v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 372, 389 S.E.2d 467,
469 (1990); Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 552, 290 S.E.2d
882, 884 (1982).
107. Id. at 369-70, 429 S.E.2d at 26-27.
108. 3 F.3d 730 (4th Cir. 1993).
109. Id. at 740.
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sales of [certain computer software] with the same func-
tionality and methodology.110
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia refused to enforce the covenant not to compete because
it was broader than necessary to protect CTrs legitimate busi-
ness interests. The district court held that the scope of employ-
ment restrictions unduly precluded Employee from working for
a competitor in any capacity. The district court further found
that the geographic scope of the agreement was broader than
necessary to protect CTI's interests. Because CTI marketed its
computer software only in Virginia, Nebraska and one other
state, CTI did not have a legitimate interest in restricting
Employee's employment throughout the United States.'
The Fourth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's
decision. In applying the same three-part test set forth in
Knighton, the court first found that the restraint was reason-
able from the employer's standpoint, especially since Employee
had access to confidential information and trade secrets of
CTI. As the court explained,
[W]hen an employee has access to confidential and trade
secret information crucial to the success of the employer's
business, the employer has a strong interest in enforcing a
covenant not to compete because other legal remedies often
prove inadequate. It will often be difficult, if not impossible,
to prove that a competing employee has misappropriated
trade secret information belonging to his former
employer.
13
110. Id. at 738.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 738-39 (citing Stoneman v. Wilson, 169 Va. 239, 247, 192 S.E. 816, 819
(1937)). According to the court:
the fact that the employment is of such a character as to inform the
employee of business methods and trade secrets which, if brought to the
knowledge of a competitor, would prejudice the interests of the employer,
tends to give an element of reasonableness to a contract that the employ-
ee will not engage in a similar business for a limited time after the
termination of his employment, and is always regarded as a strong rea-
son for upholding the contract.
169 Va. at 247, 192 S.E. at 819.
113. 3 F.3d at 739 (citing Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co.,
914 F.2d 556, 561 (4th Cir. 1990)).
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Citing several Virginia Supreme Court cases that upheld
covenants similar to the one at issue, the Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed with the district court's finding that the covenant was
overbroad because it precluded Employee from working for a
competitor of CTI in any capacity."4 The court also held that
the geographic scope of the covenant was not overly broad sim-
ply because it covered the entire United States."5 In support
for its finding that CTI had a national market for its products,
the court listed ten states in which CTI licensed its computer
software, several other states where CTI's value-added resellers
marketed the product to its customers, and several other states
where CTI had potential customers."' Because CTI had a na-
tional market for its products, the restrictions on Employee's
employment throughout the United States were no greater than
necessary to protect CTI from competition by Employee."'
The court then determined, under the second prong of the
three-part test, that the restriction was reasonable from
Employee's point of view because it restricted Employee from
engaging in only an extremely narrow category of business."'
The agreement permitted Employee to design, develop, market,
and sell any software of a type different from the two types of
software identified in the agreement, any software of the same
type having a different functionality or methodology, or any
software of the same type having the same functionality and
methodology that is not designed to run on personal comput-
ers."
9
114. 3 F.2d at 738-39 (citing Blue Ridge Anesthesia v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 374,
389 S.E.2d 467, 468 (1990)) (upholding a three-year covenant under which the em-
ployee could not "open or be employed by or act on behalf of any competitor of Em-
ployer which renders the same or similar services as Employer."); Rosenbaum, 223
Va. at 556, 290 S.E.2d at 882 (upholding a three-year restriction on an employee's
right to "own, manage, operate, control, be employed by, participate in, or be associat-
ed in any manner with the ownership, management, operation or control of any busi-
ness similar to the type of business conducted" by the employer.).
115. 3 F.3d at 739.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 740.
119. Id. With respect to the third part of the test, Employee did not argue, and
the court did not find, that the covenant was unreasonable from the standpoint of
public policy. Id.
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E. Successor Liability for Tort Claims
In Blizzard v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,' ° the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
found that a successor corporation was a mere continuation of
its predecessor and thus could be held liable for any negligence
of the predecessor."
In Blizzard, plaintiffs were injured when a passenger train
collided with a truck owned by Sears Concrete Corporation
(Sears Concrete). Plaintiffs sued the owner and operator of the
train (Amtrak) and the owner of the railroad tracks (CSX).
Defendants Amtrak and CSX instituted a third-party action
seeking contribution and indemnification against Sears Concrete
and Sears Contracting Corporation (Sears Contracting), the
corporate successor to Sears Concrete.' Subsequently, Am-
trak and CSX moved for partial summary judgment, contending
that because third party defendant Sears Contracting was the
corporate successor of Sears Concrete, it was liable for its tort
obligations.'
Sears Concrete was incorporated in 1985. Its president, Rob-
ert J. Sears (Robert) and his son, Randall K. Sears (Randall),
its treasurer, were the sole directors and shareholders of the
company. Sears Concrete was in the business of making and
hauling concrete and excavated material. It owned equipment
consisting primarily of trucks and trailers. The company em-
ployed, among others, truck drivers and clerical personnel. The
company based its operations in Gloucester, Virginia, on land
owned by Robert.'
In early April 1992, Robert and Randall began the process of
forming a new corporation for the purpose of securing more
favorable workers' compensation rates. Sears Contracting was
120. 831 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Va. 1993).
121. Id. at 548-49.
122. Amtrak and CSX also sought to join Sears Sand and Gravel, Inc., but the
court dismissed the action against that entity because it ceased to exist in 1989. Id.
at 545.
123. Id.
124. Id. Sears Concrete, however, did not pay Robert for use of the land. Id. at
545-46.
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incorporated on May 1, 1992, two days after the accident at
issue. Three weeks later, Sears Concrete transferred its
equipment to Sears Contracting. Sears Concrete received no
consideration for any equity it had in the equipment, but Sears
Contracting assumed responsibility for the remaining balances
owed on the equipment. As with Sears Concrete, Robert and
Randall were the sole directors and shareholders of Sears Con-
tracting, with Randall named as president and Robert as sec-
retary. The employees of Sears Concrete became employees of
Sears Contracting and held the same positions and performed
the same tasks as they had prior to the formation of Sears
Contracting. The new company operated out of the same offices
and same physical location as the old company, and maintained
the same address and telephone number. Although Sears
Contracting's product line expanded over time, at the time of
its incorporation, Sears Contracting sold the same services and
products to the same customers as had Sears Concrete. Despite
not being dissolved, Sears Concrete ceased doing business upon
the formation of Sears Contracting."2
Generally, a corporation that purchases the assets of another
corporation is not liable for the debts and contingent liabilities
of the selling corporation." However, as stated by the Virgin-
ia Supreme Court in Harris v. T.I., Inc., Virginia recognizes
four traditional exceptions to the general rule that a successor
corporation does not assume the liabilities of the predecessor
entity.127
In order to hold a purchasing corporation liable for the
obligations of the selling corporation, it must appear that
(1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agreed
to assume such liabilities; (2) the circumstances surrounding
the transaction warrant a finding that there was a consoli-
dation or de facto merger of the two corporations; (3) the
125. Id. at 546. According to Robert, Sears Concrete retained its corporate exis-
tence primarily because of the litigation. Id.
126. Id. at 547 (citing Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1456
(11th Cir. 1985); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977);
Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 1977); Crawford Harbor Assocs. v.
Blake Constr. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880, 883 (E.D. Va. 1987) (applying Virginia law)); see
also 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed. 1990).
127. 243 Va. 63, 70, 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (1992).
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purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the sell-
ing corporation; or (4) the transaction is fraudulent in
fact.'
Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not explicitly ad-
dressed the concept of a de facto merger in the area of succes-
sor liability, the Blizzard court cited the statement in Harris
that Virginia would likely adopt the "traditional view" of the de
facto merger exception.' The elements of the traditional view
are the following:
(1) a continuity of the selling corporation's enterprise, in-
cluding management, personnel, physical location, assets,
and general business operations; (2) a continuity of owner-
ship because the purchasing corporation acquires the assets
with shares of its own stock, which ultimately are held by
the selling corporation's shareholders; (3) prompt liquidation
and dissolution of the selling corporation's business opera-
tions; and (4) an assumption by the purchasing corporation
of the selling corporation's obligations necessary for normal
operation of the seller's business.'
Of the four elements of the de facto merger exception, the
key element is the "continuity of ownership" of the corpora-
tions.131 Because there was no sale or transfer of stock of
Sears Concrete to Sears Contracting in the Blizzard case, the
court held that the circumstances surrounding the creation and
incorporation of Sears Contracting did not warrant a finding of
a de facto merger under Virginia law."2
128. Id. Amtrak and CSX did not contend that Sears Contracting agreed to as-
sume Sears Concrete's liabilities or that the incorporation of Sears Contracting was
fraudulent. Rather, they argued that a de facto merger occurred between the two
companies or that Sears Contracting was a "mere continuation" of Sears Concrete.
831 F. Supp. at 545.
129. 831 F. Supp. at 547 (citing Harris, 243 Va. at 69-72, 413 S.E.2d at 609-10).
130. Id. (citing Bud Antle, 758 F.2d at 1457-58; Crawford Harbor, 661 F. Supp. at
884).
131. Id. (citing Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439-40 (7th Cir. 1977);
Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) ("Absent a transfer of stock,
the nature and consequences of a transaction are not those of a merger"); Crawford
Harbor, 661 F. Supp. at 884 ('The essential characteristic of a de facto merger is the
succession of the selling corporation's stockholders to stockholder status in the pur-
chasing corporation.").
132. 831 F. Supp. at 548.
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The court did, however, find that Sears Contracting was a
"mere continuation" of Sears Concrete and thus, could be held
liable for the torts of Sears Concrete." "In determining
whether one corporation is a 'mere continuation' of another
under the traditional doctrine," the essential inquiry is
whether there has been a continuation of the corporate entity of
the seller, not whether there has been a continuation of the
seller's business operations."" The key element of this inqui-
ry is whether there is "a common identity of the officers, direc-
tors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing corpora-
tions.-'3 8
The court held that Sears Contracting was a "mere continua-
tion" of Sears Concrete because: (1) Robert and Randall were
the sole stockholders and directors of both companies, which
had the same officers; (2) Sears Contracting voluntarily as-
sumed the corporate identity of Sears Concrete, in its capacity
as debtor, by taking over the payment obligations on Sears
Concrete's equipment, and in its capacity as employer, by con-
tinuing to employ the employees of Sears Concrete without any
hiatus in their employment; and (3) the two companies used the
same office, address and telephone number, as well as delivery
tags which bore the name and former telephone number of
Sears Concrete."7
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Harris, 243 Va. at 69-72, 413 S.E.2d at 609-10).
135. Id. at 548 (citing Bud Antle, 758 F.2d at 1458; Travis, 565 F.2d at 447;
Crawford Harbor, 661 F. Supp. at 885; Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96,
98 (Minn. 1989)).
136. Id. at 548 (quoting Harris, 243 Va. at 70, 413 S.E.2d at 609). Among these
three required factors (officers, directors and stockholders), the court stated that
identity of stockholders is the most important component to sustain a finding of
'mere continuation." Id. (citing Weaver v. Nash Intl. Inc., 730 F.2d 547, 548 (8th Cir.
1984); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Kego Corp., 1991 WL 36954, at *6, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis
3140, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. March 13, 1991)).
137. 831 F. Supp. at 548. The court noted that its conclusion was not altered by
the fact that Sears Concrete continued to exist following the incorporation of Sears
Contracting. "Where all other evidence points to continuity, the single remaining cor-
poration factor does not preclude a finding of mere continuation." Id. at 549.
952
